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Abstract 
 
One popular view in recent years takes the source of 
testimonial entitlement to reside in the intrinsically social 
character of testimonial exchanges. This paper looks at two 
extant incarnations of this view, what we dub ‘weak’ and 
‘modest’ social anti-reductionism, and questions the 
rationales behind their central claims. Furthermore, we put 
forth an alternative, strong social anti-reductionist account, 
and show how it does better than the competition on both 
theoretical and empirical grounds.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Reductionism in the epistemology of testimony holds that you need to 
have independent inductive reason to trust a speaker in order to be 
entitled to believe what they tell you.  Anti-reductionists disagree. They 
maintain that testimonial entitlement is easy to come by: roughly, all 
you need to do is listen to what you are being told.1  
                                                 
1 We do not mean to suggest that anti-reductionisms and reductionisms in the 
epistemology of testimony are two uniform, clearly delineated bunches. To the 
contrary, champions of both views make very distinct claims, concerning very distinct 
issues related to testimonial entitlement. See Lackey (2008) for a very useful 
taxonomy. Following champions of the views we discuss here, however – i.e. 
defenders of social anti-reductionisms – for the purposes of this paper, we are going 
to focus on the particular difference between reductionism and anti-reductionism 
when it comes to how heavy an epistemic burden they lay on hearer’s shoulders in the 
testimonial exchange: while the boundaries between the two camps are, by no means, 
clear, reductionists tend to require hearers to have some variety of access to their 
reasons to trust their testifiers, while anti-reductionism tends to deny such access is 
necessary. To put it in different words: if both views stipulate reasons to believe 
testimony in response to the Source Problem, the Reductionist reasons will be 
accessible reasons, while Anti-reductionist reasons will carry no such constraint. All 
this is still pretty vague, but one useful way to see the distinction that we care about 
here is to think of Pritchard’s (2004) taxonomy, distinguishing between what he dubs 
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 Now, say you like anti-reductionism (AR);2 one question that you 
will need to answer is how it can be that testimonial entitlement can 
come so cheaply. After all, people are free to lie. Furthermore, they tend 
to be self-interested in the first instance and so we’d expect them to lie 
when this furthers their own interests. Since people’s interests very 
often do not coincide, we’d expect lying to be a very frequent 
phenomenon. But how, then, could it be that simply taking a speaker’s 
word at face value can give you testimonial entitlement? In what 
follows, we will call this the source problem. 
One ambitious solution to the source problem is due to Tyler 
Burge (1993), who attempts to offer an a priori vindication of testimony 
as a source of entitlement.3 In a nutshell, his proposal is that intelligible 
propositional expressions presuppose rational abilities; so intelligible 
presentations-as-true come prima facie backed by a rational source. 
Since reason aims at truth, Burge argues, both the content of intelligible 
propositional presentations-as-true and the prima facie rationality of 
their source indicate a prima facie source of truth. Thus, according to 
Burge, we are a priori prima facie entitled to take intelligible affirmation 
at face value (Burge 1993, 472).  
 Burge’s claim to a priori entitlement naturally correlates with a 
strong version of anti-reductionism (SAR) according to which no 
burden lies on the hearer’s shoulders when it comes to prima facie 
testimonial entitlement: “A person is entitled to accept as true 
something that is presented as true and that is intelligible to him unless 
there are stronger reasons not to do so” (1993, 467). 
 Unfortunately, it is far from clear that Burge’s solution to the 
source problem will be ultimately successful.4 Roughly, here is why: 
                                                                                                                            
Credulism, on one hand, and Reductionism on the other. Champions of reductionism 
include Adler (1994), Audi (1997, 2004, 2006), Fricker (1995), Hume (1739), Lipton 
(1998), Lyons (1997). For defenses of anti-reductionist (credulist) views, see, e.g. 
(Kelp 2009, Simion 2016a), (Burge 1993, 1997, 1999), (Coady 1973, 1992), (Goldberg 
2006, 2010, 2014), (Goldman 1999), (Graham 2010, 2012, 2015), (Greco 
Forthcoming, 2015), (Green 2016), (Reid 1764). For hybrid views, see e.g. (Faulkner 
2011), (Lackey 2003, 2008), (Pritchard 2004). 
2 There are plenty of reasons to like anti-reductionism; first and foremost, it looks as 
though a lot, if not most of our knowledge is testimonial. Due to our physical and 
psychological limitations, we learn a lot of the things we know from say-so. The fact 
that testimonial knowledge is so ubiquitous makes sense if testimonial knowledge is 
as easy to come by as the anti-reductionist would have it. But see, e.g. Green (2016) 
for a nice overview of extant arguments pro and against anti-reductionism. 
3 Since “prima facie intelligible propositional contents prima facie presented as true 
bear an a priori prima facie conceptual relation to a rational source of true 
presentations-as-true”, “we are a priori entitled to accept something that is prima 
facie intelligible and presented as true”. “One has a general entitlement to rely on the 
rationality of rational beings”(Burge 1993, 469). 
4 Many people in the literature have expressed doubts concerning the purity of the a 
priori nature of Burge’s advocated source of entitlement (see, for instance (Audi 
2004)). This falls outside the scope of this paper. 
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Burge’s claim that reasoning aims at truth is at best true of theoretical 
reasoning. However, we are multi-faceted rational agents, in the sense 
that we at least also engage in practical reasoning. When it comes to 
practical reasoning, plausibly, the aim at stake will be a prudential one – 
say, desire satisfaction.5 Furthermore, it looks as though the latter can, 
at least in principle, take primacy over the former, and will plausibly 
tend to do so in the very cases that motivate the source problem: when 
practical rationality will require the testifier to lie in order to serve her 
self-interest, this practical aim will often enough prevail over the 
epistemic aim of reaching/delivering truth (Simion 2016a, Goldberg 
2014).  
 In the light of these difficulties, in recent years, several 
philosophers have offered alternative versions of AR that are weaker, in 
the sense that they are associated with less ambitious proposals 
concerning the source of hearer’s entitlement.  One prominent proposal 
on the market is social anti-reductionism (e.g. Graham (2010), Greco 
(Forthcoming, 2015)). They key idea of this view is to appeal to facts 
about the inherently social nature of testimonial exchanges to address 
the source problem. 
 Now, depending on the identity of the relevant social facts, the 
proponents of social versions of AR put forth more or less ambitious 
varieties of anti-reductionism, in the sense that they place more or less 
epistemic burden on the hearer’s shoulders. One thing these proposals 
have in common, though, is that since the advocated source of 
entitlement is taken to be less epistemically secure than in Burge’s 
proposal, the associated anti-reductionist claim is also weaker. 
 This paper questions the grounds for this correlation: it is 
argued here that (1) social versions of AR need not imply weaker anti-
reductionist commitments and (2) the argument to the contrary made 
by social anti-reductionists fails. Furthermore, we propose an 
alternative solution to the source problem that not only falls in the 
social AR camp but also supports a strong version of AR. This view, we 
argue, is superiority to its weaker rivals. 
 In order to achieve this, we will first take a closer look at the 
source problem and distinguish two dimensions of it (section #2). We 
will then turn to two of the main varieties of social AR in the literature: 
moderate and weak social anti-reductionism. More specifically, we will 
                                                 
5 Burge (1993) is aware of this. In response, he argues that reason has a “teleological 
aspect” and that one of its “primary functions” is “that of presenting truth” (475). We 
can grant Burge as much, However, since a trait can have more than one primary 
function, and since the requirements associated with the fulfilling of one can override 
the requirements associated with fulfilling the other in cases of conflict, we take it that 
more work is needed to appease the reductionist worries. See (Simion 2016a) for 
discussion. 
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first turn to Peter Graham’s moderate version of AR and identify two 
problems with his solution to the source problem (sections #3 and #4). 
Sections #5 and #6 focus on John Greco’s weak anti-reductionism. 
While the view looks promising, especially in that it offers an appealing 
solution to the source problem, we argue that a social version of SAR, 
properly understood, does equally well.  Since SAR is the simpler and 
more uniform of the two, there is reason to favor SAR. In section #7 we 
conclude. 
 
 
2. Two Dimensions of the Source Problem 
 
It will be useful to first distinguish between two dimensions of the 
source problem. The first is subjective. Here, the worry is that taking a 
speaker’s word at face value when people may be expected to lie so 
frequently would amount to a form of gullibility that is incompatible 
with such entitlement. Call this the subjective source problem (SSP). It 
concerns the hearer’s being a conscientious epistemic agent, doing her 
epistemic job – whatever that might turn out to be – well. 
 Crucially, there is a further, objective, dimension to the source 
problem. To see this, note that even if we have our guards up, i.e. we are 
doing what we can in order to detect lies and other forms of deception, 
if we are just bad at it, we will hardly ever successfully detect when we 
are deceived. While, in this case, we cannot be charged with gullibility, 
the fact that lying may occur frequently continues to threaten testimony 
as a bona fide source of entitlement. In what follows, we will refer to 
this as the objective source problem (OSP).  
 These considerations suggest that OSP differs from SSP in that a 
solution to SSP does not guarantee a solution to OSP. It may be worth 
noting that the converse also holds. Suppose it turns out that testimony 
is extremely reliable because, as a matter of fact, speakers lie only very 
rarely.  If so, it is quite plausible that OSP is no longer particularly 
worrisome. Compatibly with that hearers may be gullible in forming 
testimonial beliefs, say because they have excellent reason for thinking 
that others lie quite often. In that case, they will not end up with 
testimonial entitlements. SSP still stands.  
 
 
3. Graham’s Moderate Anti-Reductionism  
 
In this section, we will look at Peter Graham’s moderate version of anti-
reductionism (MAR) and how it ventures to tackle both SSP and OSP, 
starting with the former.  
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3.1 SSP: Comprehension and Filtering 
 
Here is a rough sketch of MAR: the hearer need not do much: all there is 
needed for (prima facie, pro tanto) testimonial entitlement on the 
hearer’s side is for her to form her beliefs via a properly functioning 
process of comprehension and filtering that has the function of reliably 
generating true beliefs. Comprehension will be in charge with uptake, 
while filtering has the job of detecting indications of untrustworthiness.   
 Since independent inductive reasons for trusting the speaker are 
not required, Graham view qualifies as a version of AR. What makes the 
view modest is the fact that it imposes an active filtering demand on the 
hearers, which narrows the range of entitlement conferring testimonial 
exchanges. In this way, it is weaker than SAR, which does not require 
such filtering. At the same time, MAR is still quite a strong view in the 
sense that, like SAR, independent inductive reasons are never required 
for the acquisition of testimonial entitlement. Rather, comprehension 
and filtering are sufficient.  
 It will come as no great surprise that the filtering condition is 
what Graham takes to deal with SSP. The thought here is that even if 
simply taking a speaker’s word at face value is tantamount to an 
objectionable form of gullibility, doing so after having filtered for 
indications of untrustworthiness isn’t.   
 
 
3.2 OSP: Internalized Social Norms 
 
What about OSP? To answer this question, let’s look at the decision-
theoretic picture that gives OSP its bite. Here it goes. Speakers are free 
agents and can choose to not tell the truth. Furthermore, speaker and 
hearer interests do not necessarily align: plausibly, while hearers care 
about getting true beliefs, testifiers are rather interested in influencing 
what a hearer believes (Faulkner 2011). On a simple economic 
rationality picture, then, rational speakers are bound to prioritize their 
own interests over hearer’s interests, and when the former do not align 
with the latter, they will be little inclined to tell the truth. In this way, 
there is a serious threat to testimony as a bona fide source of 
entitlement and it’s just not clear that the filtering requirement will be 
enough to properly address it. 
 According to Graham, however, this decision-theoretic picture 
isn’t quite accurate: we don’t, as a matter of fact, work like well-oiled 
economic machines. To see why, think of the ultimatum game:  
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ULTIMATUM:  
There are two players, a proposer and a responder. The 
proposer is given a sum of money – say, EUR 100. He then must 
propose a split of the money between the proposer and the 
responder. The responder’s job is to accept or refuse the split. If 
accepted, both parties receive the amount proposed. If refused, 
no one gets anything. As such, both parties are better off if the 
responder accepts the split. 
 
Note that, according to rational choice theory, the proposer should 
propose EUR 1 for the responder and EUR 99 for the proposer. Also, the 
responder should accept the offer. After all, the thought goes, EUR 1 is 
better than nothing. 
 Across a very wide variety of human cultures, however, that is 
not what happens. Instead, the proposer tends to offer something in the 
vicinity of a 40/60 split. Furthermore, in cases where the proposer does 
offer a much smaller split to the responder, the responder tends to 
refuse.  
 Here is one explanation of this behavior, which has been 
extremely popular with social scientists, whilst also seemingly violating 
the axioms of rational choice theory. We humans have internalized 
social norms of fair divisions of goods (Bowles and Gintis (2003), 
Faulkner (2011), Graham (2010, 2015)). Furthermore, the motivation 
provided by internalized social norms frequently takes primacy over 
motivations that accord with rational choice theory. That’s why we tend 
to offer closer to equal splits and refuse splits that we take to be too 
unequal. 
 Accordingly, then, just like in the Ultimatum game, when we play 
the testimony game we don’t simply have the kinds of motivations 
rational choice theory would predict.  Speakers have internalized a 
social norm that prescribes telling the truth informatively, and the 
motivation provided by this social norm frequently overrides any 
motivation that rational choice theory predicts we should have: 
speakers will frequently tell the truth even when it is in their best 
interest not to (Graham (2010, 223), (2015, 256)). As such, Graham 
argues, the threat posed by OSP is, to a large extent, averted.  
 
  
4. Problems for MAR 
 
4.1 Perception 
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MAR centrally features an active filtering requirement on the hearer’s 
side, on top of merely comprehending the content that is being offered. 
As a first observation, note that an equivalent feature is missing in 
Graham’s (2012) account of perceptual entitlement: here, a properly 
functioning uptake mechanism – i.e. perceptual process – is enough. 
Importantly, that is not to say that perceivers are to lack any sensitivity 
to defeat; quite to the contrary. It’s one thing for me to actively monitor 
our testimonial exchanges for signs of deception, however, and it is 
quite another to merely be counterfactually sensitive to such signs. The 
former, of course, is a much stronger requirement than the latter. 
 Now, why should testimony and perception differ in this way? 
Note that Graham had better offer a good answer to this question, as 
otherwise the difference in treatment would appear to be unmotivated. 
Key to what he has to say here6 is the thought that perception is 
considerably more reliable than (unfiltered) testimony. While the norm 
internalization story turns testimony into a decently reliable source of 
beliefs, it still gets it nowhere near the score of perception. To see this, 
just note that, in addition to all the sorts of things that can go wrong in 
the acquisition of both perceptual and testimonial belief and despite the 
detracting influence of norm internalization, the fact remains that 
people frequently lie. As a result, (unfiltered) testimony is considerably 
less reliable than perception.  The filtering requirement, then, is added 
in the case of testimony in order to further reduce the differences in 
reliability between the two.  
 While we are willing to concede that Graham’s motivations seem 
just fine intuitively, when it comes to matters concerning higher or 
lower degrees of reliably, intuitions are not the data we should turn to. 
After all, if this is right, it is an empirical matter of fact. As such, what we 
need in order to support the Graham view are some variety or another 
of relevant statistical data. 
 Luckily, relevant data are, as a matter of fact, available; 
unfortunately for the Graham view, however, empirical results seem to 
fail to support MAR. A wide range of studies testing our capacities for 
deception recognition show that are very bad at it: our prospects of 
getting it right barely surpass chance (e.g. Kraut 1980, Vrij 2000 and 
Bond and DePaulo 2006). To see just how well-established this result is 
in the relevant psychological literature, consider the following telling 
passage from Levine et al.: “the belief that deception detection accuracy 
rates are only slightly better than fifty-fifty is among the most well 
documented and commonly held conclusions in deception research.” 
(1999, 126)7  
                                                 
6 Graham, personal communication. 
7 Could all these studies be flawed? Since we are not psychologists, we are in no 
position to settle this question. At the same time, given that there is a general 
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 Crucially, it is not hard to see that if these studies are right and 
we detect deception with an accuracy rate that is barely above chance, 
the differences in reliability between those who accept testimony 
without further filtering and those who do make the additional effort of 
filtering will be negligible (see Michaelian 2010 for a detailed and 
illuminating argument of this point).  
 Of course, this bad news for Graham. After all, recall his reason 
for treating perception and testimony differently. Since people 
frequently lie testimony is considerably less reliable than perception. 
Adding a filtering requirement was to reduce this difference by 
increasing the reliability of testimony. What the above considerations 
indicate is that filtering fails to deliver the goods. As a result, Graham’s 
motivation for giving perception and testimony different treatments 
fails.8   
  
 
4.2 The Ultimatum Game with High(er) Stakes 
 
Even if it’s now no longer clear that we have reason to weaken SAR 
along the lines suggested by Graham, it may well be that we can hold on 
to SAR and adopt Graham’s solution to OSP. That would mean at least 
some progress on the problems for SAR.  
 Unfortunately, there is reason to believe that Graham’s proposal 
on this front is also not fully satisfactory. To see why, let us first go back 
to the ultimatum game. Recall that Graham endorsed one particular 
explanation of the phenomenon offered by social scientists: while 
strictly speaking irrational from the perspective of choice theory, what 
is going on here makes sense from a social science perspective: people 
internalize social norms and their acts become strongly determined by 
this internalization.  
 Now, notably, this explanation of the ultimatum game has not 
remained unchallenged by rational choice theorists. To see why, 
consider a high stakes version of the game, where the sum to be divided 
                                                                                                                            
consensus in the relevant literature, it does not seem tendentious to work on the 
assumption that the consensus view is correct. 
8 Might there be other reasons for thinking that (unfiltered) testimony is less reliable 
than perception that would serve to motivate a filtering requirement? Perhaps. That 
said, the onus is of course on Graham to produce the relevant argument. What’s more, 
there are a couple of lessons that the discussion of lying teaches are suggest that this 
will at least not be a trivial task. First, not any old difference in reliability we may 
discover will serve to motivate a difference in treatment between testimony and 
perception. Second, whether filtering improves the reliability of testimony in a 
relevant way is an empirical question, which cannot be settled from the armchair. 
And, finally, to make the motivation stick, Graham will also have to show that 
whatever reliability-diminishing features of testimony he may come up cannot 
already be dealt with by SAR’s anti-defeat condition.  
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is very large, say a billion Euros. Intuitively, if we were in the 
respondent’s shoes and we were offered a million Euros, no matter how 
unfair we might find the offer, we would take it.  
 And indeed, studies show that as the sum at stake increases, the 
proportion of the endowment offered decreases. Also, rejection rates 
decrease drastically when stakes increase: “ … among respondents we 
find a considerable effect of stakes: while at low stakes we observe 
rejections in the range of the extant literature, in the highest stakes 
condition we observe only a single rejection out of 24 responders” 
(Andersen et al. 2011).9  
 What high stakes versions of the ultimatum game suggest, then, 
is that the explanation in terms of internalized social norms may not be 
quite right: something else might be going on, at least in higher stakes 
versions of the ultimatum game. But if there must be some other 
explanation in high stakes version of the ultimatum game, it’s no longer 
clear that the explanation in terms of internalized social norms is 
correct even in the low stakes versions of the game. After all, if 
whatever explains the behavior in the high stakes version of the game 
will also work for its low stakes cousin, simplicity and uniformity will 
enjoin us to favor it over the explanation in terms of internalized social 
norms.  
 Of course, that is not to say that the defender of the account in 
terms of social norms internalization could not offer a plausible non-
uniform account, together with a good reason to believe such an 
account is, in fact, preferable on relevant grounds.10 Several people in 
the literature suggest that norm conformity may take a variety of 
shapes: according to Christina Bicchieri (2006), for instance, norm 
conformity varies between different types of norms. Jonathan Heidt 
(2001) argues that responses to moral factors might be more emotional 
than rational, in which case a non-uniform explanation seems to not be 
easily dismissible. Heinrich and Heinrich (2007) argue that humans are 
becoming more and more prone to cooperate, which suggests an 
evolutionary explanation to why we do so in the first place. If that is the 
case, that is, if our tendency to cooperate is itself in motion, again, it is 
not clear that we should expect a uniform account in this regard.11 
                                                 
9 Although, of course, what counts as ‘high stakes’ itself might vary across cultures. In 
societies with exposure to western market economies even when the stakes were set 
at what amounted to 2 weeks wages, there was still no change in behavior (Henrich et 
al., 2004). 
10 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing us on this count. 
11 Crucially, according to (Heinrich and Heinrich 2007), we are evolving from merely 
cooperating within very small, close communities, to large-scale cooperation. See the 
next section for discussion of social cooperation in connection with social roles.  
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 Unfortunately, none of this is of much use for Graham. Here is 
why: recall that Graham’s key motivation for his solution to OSP is that 
reflection on the ultimatum game teaches that people’s behavior is 
driven by internalized social norms even when this runs counter to 
their interest. As a result, testimony was taken to be, as a matter of fact, 
a reliable source: people do reliably tell the truth because they have 
internalized the social norm requiring them to do so, even in cases 
where this runs counter to their best interest. Note, however, that what 
the discussion above suggests is that social norms, at best (if at all) will 
act accordingly in low stakes cases – where the corresponding loss is 
not significant. As soon as the stakes are raised, however, things 
change: conformity is out, self-interest-guided behavior is in. And even 
if it turns out that this does not dislodge the norm-internalization 
account for low stakes cases, the fact that self-interest rules in high-
stakes cases still means trouble for Graham. After all, the source 
problem now reappears for Graham, albeit in a new guise. Whereas in 
the original version of OSP, the worry was that lying may occur 
frequently enough to threaten testimony as a bona fide source of 
entitlement, the new worry is that lying may occur frequently enough in 
high stakes cases to threaten testimony in this way. And, of course, 
Graham’s appeal to norm internalization will simply not help with this 
version of OSP. 
  
 
 
5. Greco’s Weak Anti-Reductionism 
 
5.1 SSP: Social Roles 
 
Just how far does the gullibility worry extend? It’s hard to deny that 
simply taking the speaker’s word at face value will amount to 
objectionable gullibility in some cases. Thus consider:  
 
Case 1. An FBI agent questions a suspect in a murder mystery.   
Case 2. A used car salesman tells you that the vehicle is in mint 
condition.   
 
By the same token, it’s plausible that testimonial entitlement requires 
independent inductive reason to trust the speakers here.  
But what about these cases:  
 
Case 3.  A teacher tells his pupil that two plus two is four. 
Case 4.  A mother tells her child that they are moving to Norway. 
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Here it is far from clear that taking the speakers’ word at face value will 
amount to gullibility. On the contrary, it is intuitively plausible that, in 
these cases, the hearers will acquire testimonial entitlement even if 
they do not have independent inductive reasons to trust the speakers.  
 As Greco (2015: 287) forcefully argues, it now looks as though 
accounts of testimonial entitlement face the following dilemma: 
 
 GRECO’S DILEMMA: 
1. Either testimonial entitlement requires independent 
inductive reason on the part of the hearer or it does not. 
2. If it does not, then testimonial entitlement is too easy to 
come by (e.g. in Cases 1 and 2).  
3. If it does, then testimonial entitlement is too hard to come by 
(e.g. in Cases 3 and 4).  
4. Therefore, an adequate account of testimonial entitlement is 
impossible: a given account must make testimonial 
entitlement either too easy for some cases or too hard for 
others.  
 
Now, as Greco is quick to observe, the dilemma presupposes that either 
independent inductive reasons to trust the speaker are always required 
for testimonial entitlement or else that they are never required. In other 
words, we will get the dilemma only if we have to choose between 
reductionism on the one hand and a view like MAR or SAR on the other. 
Fortunately, however, these are not our only options. There is another 
way of being an anti-reductionist. This alternative, which Greco himself 
prefers, amounts to a mere denial of reductionism.  The key idea of this 
weak form of anti-reductionism (WAR) is that while testimonial 
entitlement will sometimes require us to have independent inductive 
reasons to trust the speaker, at other times, we can have it simply by 
taking the speaker’s word at face value.  
 It’s easy to see the attractions of WAR vis-à-vis both SAR and 
MAR. Once we resist the idea that SSP properly targets all cases of 
testimonial belief, we can require independent inductive reasons for 
the cases that it does affect. Since WAR offers a reductionist treatment 
of the cases for which the gullibility worry does arise, it improves on 
SAR, which would appear to blatantly succumb to the problem even in 
these cases. Importantly, however, it also promises to improve on MAR. 
After all, even if there is reason to believe filtering does not improve the 
reliability of testimony, it may seem plausible enough that positive 
inductive reason to trust speakers does. Finally, since an anti-
reductionist treatment of the remaining cases is independently 
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plausible, it would appear that WAR does all it needs to do in order to 
deal with SSP. 
 Of course, a key question for WAR is exactly when independent 
inductive reasons are required and when they aren’t. It is here that 
Greco’s specifically social version of AR comes in. More specifically, he 
claims that whether or not independent inductive reasons are required 
for testimonial entitlement depends on the social roles of the 
participants to the conversation. If they belong to the same community 
of knowers, testimonial entitlement is easy to come by: all they need to 
do is take the speaker’s word at face value. On the other hand, if they do 
not belong to the same community of knowers, hearers shoulder a more 
substantive epistemic burden: they need positive reasons to trust the 
speaker (2015, 292).  
 Now, one question that immediately arises is why there is this 
difference in epistemic burden on the hearer; another is how the source 
problem is addressed, i.e. why we should think that when speakers 
belong to the same community of knowers, they can acquire testimonial 
entitlement simply by taking the speaker’s word at face value.  
 The first part of Greco’s answer is that participants to 
testimonial exchanges within a community of knowers engage in a 
different kind of activity than participants to testimonial exchanges 
who do not belong to a community of knowers. More specifically, the 
former centrally involves the distribution of information within a 
community of knowers, whereas the latter centrally involves the 
acquisition of information for the community. Crucially, these two 
activities have different functions, which, in turn, give rise to different 
normative requirements. Agents who are engaged in acquiring 
information for their community have a gatekeeping function. They are 
in charge with letting only genuine information into the system and 
sifting out misinformation. Note that there is a premium on avoidance 
of error here. That’s why we find demanding normative requirements 
for testimonial entitlement in this kind of case: in order to ensure 
avoidance of error positive reasons for trusting the speaker are 
required. In contrast, agents who are engaged in distributing 
information within a community are in charge with efficiently 
distributing high quality information within a community of knowers. 
Note that what matters here is productivity in the distribution of truths. 
That’s why the normative requirements for testimonial entitlement are 
laxer here: allowing hearers to take speakers’ words at face value is a 
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highly productive way of distributions information within the 
community.12 
 Finally, Greco maintains that the detective and the salesman 
cases are cases of information acquisition: the corresponding social 
roles place the agents in importantly different epistemic communities. 
As a result, testimonial entitlement will be subject to demanding 
normative requirements: independent inductive reasons for trusting 
the speaker are needed. In contrast, children and their parents are a 
paradigmatic case of epistemic agents belonging to the same epistemic 
community, as are pupils and their teachers. For that reason, the 
normative requirements at issue in these exchanges are the more 
lenient ones: taking the speaker’s word at face value is just fine, positive 
reasons are not needed.  
 
 
5.2 OSP: Practical Interests  
 
It might be thought the Greco’s account of how functions give rise to 
different norms holds the key to his solution to OSP. In particular, it 
might be thought that when testimonial entitlement comes on the 
cheap, the relevant information has already been subject to serious 
gatekeeping by another member of the community. That’s why 
testimony within a group can be a bona fide source of entitlement. 
 On reflection, however, we think that this cannot be the whole 
story. After all, the core of OSP – i.e. how, in the face of the fact that we 
may expect lying to occur frequently enough, testimony can be a bona 
fide source of entitlement – is simply not addressed. Why is it that, 
within the same epistemic community, one is entitled to take speakers’ 
word at face value? That said, given how central the idea of the kinds of 
epistemic community that are exemplified by Cases 3 and 4 is to Greco’s 
account of the epistemology of testimony, it would be surprising if they 
played no role in the solution to the source problem. We can think of at 
least two ways in Greco could bring the kinds of community he has in 
mind into play here. 
 First, he could claim that for the kinds of communities he has in 
mind, there is particularly strong gatekeeping. As a result, in general, 
the probability of receiving a true belief via testimony within an 
epistemic community of the relevant kind is high enough that it remains 
                                                 
12 Greco appeals to Craig’s (1990) account of the concept of knowledge in order to 
motivate his view. Even if Craig’s story will do the trick for Greco, we don’t think that 
it is essential to the success of his argument. Since not everyone buys Craig’s approach 
to epistemology, it’s worth seeing that Greco’s view does not depend on it in its own 
right. 
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above the threshold of what is required for testimonial knowledge even 
after we factor in the probability of receiving a false belief due to lying. 
Even if we grant that this line works for some of the communities Greco 
has in mind (e.g. expert-laymen communities where the expert testifies 
on his domain of expertise), the prospects that it will work in general 
are not so bright. After all, some communities feature ordinary (non-
expert) agents who form their beliefs in ordinary ways, i.e. without 
engaging in especially strong gatekeeping (e.g. family communities in 
which people may tell each other all sorts of things, including what they 
read in the tabloids).  
 Fortunately, there is another and better way of bringing 
epistemic communities to bear on the source problem. The thought 
here is that members of epistemic communities are less likely to lie to 
one another. The key question is, of course, why one should think that 
this is so. Here is one promising answer that suggests itself:13 belonging 
to the same community means having at least some joint practical 
interests, be it joint individual interests or joint community interests. 
Crucially, false beliefs may lead to actions that may be counter-
conducive to these interests. When one shares in a joint interest, then, it 
will also be in one’s interest that those whom one shares this interest 
with have true beliefs rather than false ones. In this way, there is 
independent reason for members of communities not to lie to other 
members of their communities. That’s why the possibility of lying 
looms much less large within groups. And that’s how Greco’s idea of an 
epistemic community may allow him to make progress on OSP.           
 
 
6. The Case against WAR and for SAR 
 
While Greco’s version of WAR may look attractive, we think that there 
is ultimately reason to resist it. Crucially, however, what we will offer 
here is not a knock-down argument against the view, but rather reason 
to think that it does not do better than SAR. Since between the two SAR 
is the simpler view, this will suffice to make a case for SAR over WAR. 
Along the way we will develop how we think a champion of SAR can 
(and should) deal with SSP and OSP.   
 
       
6.1 SSP Again 
 
                                                 
13 According to Greco (pc) shared interests as one central feature for delineating the 
communities at stake. 
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Let’s remind ourselves of one of Greco’s crucial cases: 
 
Case 4. A mother tells her small child that they are moving to Norway. 
 
Greco’s explanation of the intuition that no positive reasons are needed 
for the child to enjoy epistemic entitlement is, roughly, the following: in 
virtue of their social roles, the child and the mother belong to the same 
epistemic community. As such, what is at stake here is transmission of 
information within the social system, which is governed by lenient 
norms; therefore, an anti-reductionist treatment recommends itself. 
 Now consider: 
 
Case 5. A small child tells her mother that the closure principle for 
knowledge holds. 
 
We take it that we all share the intuition that, in this testimonial 
exchange, the mother is not entitled to believe the corresponding 
content. Furthermore, if she is to permissibly do so, she should have 
independent reason to trust her child’s word. The trouble for Greco is 
that WAR predicts that the mother is entitled to believe what her child 
tells her. To see this, recall that, in Case 4, the child turned out to be to 
believe her mother in virtue of the fact that the mother belongs to the 
same epistemic community as the child. It is hard to deny, however, 
that belonging to the same epistemic community is a symmetric relation. 
This means that the mother belongs to the same epistemic community 
as the child if and only if the child belongs to the same epistemic 
community as the mother. In that case, however, WAR predicts that the 
testimonial exchange is governed by the lenient norms relevant to the 
distribution function of testimony and testimonial entitlement comes 
on the cheap here.14  
 Just why does Greco’s account fail? Here is one suggestion that 
looks attractive, at least at first glance. The view is too coarse-grained. 
The only distinction countenanced is between agents who share an 
epistemic community and agents who don’t. In this way, Greco’s 
treatment of the former agents is horizontal in the sense that, as soon as 
two agents belong to the same community, they are on equal footing 
when it comes to testimonial entitlement.  What cases like Case 5 
suggest is that more structure is needed to give an adequate account of 
the testimonial entitlement for agents who share an epistemic 
community. Even within an epistemic community, there is an expertise 
                                                 
14 Note, also, that similar contrast cases can be built with students and teachers, 
experts and laymen and so on. 
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scale and testimonial entitlement comes on the cheap for agents further 
down on this scale, but not the other way around. What’s needed, then, 
is a vertical treatment even for agents who belong to the same 
epistemic community.15    
 Consider, however: 
 
Case 6. Your doctor tells you that you should not worry, the tumor is 
benign. 
 
Case 7. Blushing, sweating heavily, babbling like never before and 
looking the other way, your doctor tells you that you should not worry, 
the tumor is benign. 
 
Plausibly, you and your doctor belong to the same social 
network/epistemic community. Furthermore, even if some reader were 
to not share the intuition here, note that Greco is going to have to say 
that we do, if WAR is to keep with its original picture. After all, it is no 
less plausible that doctors and patients belong to the same community 
of knowers than that mothers and children or teachers and their pupils 
do. In other words, if it’s plausible that the agents in Cases 4 and 5 
belong to the same epistemic community, then the same goes for Cases 
6 and 7. While this is all good and well for Case 6, Case 7 means trouble 
for Greco. After all, even though you and your doctor belong to the same 
epistemic community you are not entitled to trust her word on the 
nature of the tumor; if anything, you are entitled to suspect that the 
exact opposite is the case. Note also, that the move from a horizontal to 
a vertical account of intra-community testimonial entitlements won’t 
solve this problem for Greco. After all, the doctor is clearly the expert 
here and so we do have the right kind of vertical direction of 
information flow going on: downhill on the expertise scale.  
 Now, here’s one piece of philosophical trivia: Case 7 features 
undercutting defeaters. Blushing, sweating heavily, babbling and 
looking the other way are the paradigm cases of defeaters cited in the 
literature. If that is the case, the defender of WAR could argue, all that’s 
needed here is to supplement the account with an anti-defeat condition. 
After all, any account of entitlement will need this anyway, 
independently of the details. So, champions of WAR could argue, there’s 
nothing problematic about the fact that WAR cannot account for all 
cases in the absence of such proviso.  
                                                 
15 Note that Greco may plausibly enough hold on to the idea that one’s position on the 
scale is determined by one’s social role. On this view, then, the expertise scale is kind 
of a social hierarchy such that one’s position in it is determined by one’s social role 
(parent, teacher, etc.)  
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 And there is even more good news for champions of WAR: 
(depending on how it will be spelled out), the added anti-defeat 
condition is likely going to take care of cases of ‘uphill’ testimony also: 
after all, plausibly, the young age of the child, together with the high 
sophistication needed for merely understanding the content of the 
assertion in Case 5 constitutes itself in quite a serious defeater too. As a 
result, champions of WAR may just be able to stick to Greco’s horizontal 
account of testimonial entitlement within epistemic communities.  
 In a nutshell, then, once supplemented with a workable anti-
defeat condition, WAR looks promising again: Be it transmission or 
acquisition, the thought would go, hearers need to be sensitive to 
defeaters. In the case of transmission, that is all the work resting on the 
hearer’s shoulders. In cases of acquisition, though, more is needed: on 
top of this anti-defeat sensitivity, positive reasons to trust the speaker’s 
testimony are also required in order to enjoy epistemic entitlement.  
 That said, once we supplement WAR by an anti-defeat condition, 
which does serious epistemic work across a range of cases, it is no 
longer clear how much of the motivation to endorse a dual account of 
testimonial entitlement will remain. That is because, at least at first 
glance, a classical, strong variety of anti-reductionism, equipped with an 
anti-defeat condition, will do just fine in accounting for the reductionist 
intuitions in the Greco cases too.  
 Recall, first, the two cases: 
 
Case 1. An FBI agent questions a suspect in a murder mystery.   
Case 2. A used car salesman tells you that the vehicle is in mint 
condition.   
 
And now recall Burge’s classic statement of SAR:  
 
“A person is entitled to accept as true something that is 
presented as true and that is intelligible to him unless there are 
stronger reasons not to do so” (Burge 1993, 467).  
 
Note that it is plausible that, in both Cases 1 and 2, the hearers have 
fairly serious undercutting defeaters for believing what they are told. In 
Case 1, the fact that the testifier is a suspect generates such a defeater, 
while, in Case 2, it is the fact that the person who is telling you about the 
condition of the car is a used car salesman. As such, in order to acquire 
testimonial entitlement, our agents need positive reason for thinking 
that these undercutting defeaters do not obtain (in other words, they 
need defeater defeaters).  
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 The important point here is, of course, that even if SAR grants a 
prima facie entitlement to take a speaker’s word at face value, this is 
compatible with SAR requiring positive reason for trusting the speaker 
in individual cases. In fact, there is reason to believe that SAR’s 
treatment of Cases 1 and 2 promises to be even better than many 
reductionist alternatives. After all, what many reductionist accounts of 
testimonial entitlement require in terms of independent inductive 
reason for trusting the speaker is something like reason to think that 
she is in general a reliable testifier (perhaps on the topic at hand). The 
trouble is that this won’t do the trick in all cases. To see this, consider 
Case 1. It may be that the speaker is in general a reliable testifier 
(perhaps even on the topic of murder cases). But that’s not enough for 
the agent to acquire testimonial entitlement here. After all, the fact that, 
as a suspect, she has such excellent reason to lie on this particular 
occasion will constitute an undercutting defeater despite her general 
reliability (on the topic). What this suggests is, of course, that we not 
only need positive reasons, we need a particular variety thereof, the 
kind of considerations that are able to defeat the present defeaters. In 
other words, an explanation in terms of the anti-defeat condition is the 
most plausible option here.  
 As a result, there is reason to believe that if WAR can solve SSP, 
the same goes for SAR. If so, of course, WAR fails to improve on SAR on 
this count.  
 
 
6.2 OSP Again 
 
Even so, WAR still offers an appealing solution to OSP. Since, however, 
the most promising version of this solution crucially invokes the idea of 
an epistemic community, it is hard to see how it could be available to 
champions of SAR.  
 The good news is that it doesn’t have to be. There exists an 
equally promising account that will work even on SAR.  In order to get 
there, we would like to first look at an alternative explanation of what is 
going on in ultimatum games.  
 According to rational choice theorists, behavior in high stakes 
ultimatum games suggests a different explanation of the initial data: the 
existence of the social norm – independently of whether it is 
internalized or not – affects the utility profile at stake for both parties. 
Ceteris paribus, norms license sanctions of violations and individuals 
get psychological benefits from engaging in sanctioning when faced 
with norm violations. Also, norms engender obligations towards 
people, and failing to live up to these obligations may cause 
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psychological harm in those affected. On the other hand, of course, 
stakes also affect the utility profile. For respondents, when they are 
sufficiently low, the benefit of sanctioning, respectively the costs of 
effrontery outweigh the financial benefit. If the stakes are sufficiently 
high, however, the financial benefits outweigh the benefits of 
sanctioning. Proponents also stand to gain form conforming with the 
social norm – in terms of good reputation, social approval and so on. 
Also, there’s the benefit involved in the decreasing risk of being subject 
to sanctioning.  
 According to these champions of choice theory, then, in 
ultimatum games, the two parties are, in fact, maximizing their 
expected utility; financial benefits, though, are not the only things that 
translate into expected utility: social benefits count quite heavily in the 
balance. Furthermore, it is argued, where there is a social norm, 
conforming enjoys default rationality. Violations, of course, can also be 
rational: when your life is at stake, for instance, you are likely not to be 
counted on to respect much in the way of any norms, social norms 
included. However, strong overriding reason is needed to get one to 
leave the default position (e.g. Bolton (1991), Ochs and Roth (1989)).  
 If that is the case, however, that is, if the default position in 
production of testimony is norm compliance, it makes sense that the 
default position for the hearer is entitlement to ‘buy the product’. Here 
is, then, the alternative, social strong anti-reductionist picture proposed 
by this paper (SSAR): hearers are prima facie entitled to their 
testimony-based beliefs. Even though speakers are free to deceive, no 
positive reasons to trust one’s testifiers are needed, nor is it the case 
that hearers need to do filtering work.16 
 The objective source of this entitlement resides in the existence 
of social norms17 forbidding improper testimony18 – be it deceiving, un-
evidenced or the like. Conforming to the norms enjoys default 
rationality. Violations, of course, can also be rational: when your life is 
                                                 
16 Note that, crucially, what matters for us in this paper is a normative claim: we are 
asking: what is the default permissible position for hearers? The reductionist 
answers: disbelief (in the sense of not believing), unless positive reasons to believe 
are present. Why? Because the default permissible position for speakers is to say what 
coincides with their purposes, which may or may not be the truth. Our account argues 
(based on the relevant decision literature): norm conformity on the speaker side 
(telling the truth) is the default permissible position. Therefore, believing is the 
default permissible position for hearers. 
17 For a contractarian incarnation of strong social anti-reductionism, see Simion 
(2016a).  
18  For knowledge accounts of epistemically proper assertion, see e.g. (Kelp 
Forthcoming), (Kelp and Simion 2017), (Simion 2016b), (Williamson 2000). For 
justification views, see (Douven 2006) and (Lackey 2007). For a defense of a truth 
norm of assertion, see (Weiner 2005). 
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at stake, for instance, you are likely to lie if needed. However, strong 
overriding reason is needed to get one to leave the default position. 
Since the utility picture is such that overriding requires unusually 
strong reason, it is likely to not happen very often: the (social) costs are 
too high. This, in turn, explains why testimony can be a bona fide source 
of entitlement, despite our incapacity to spot deception. In this way, 
SAR addresses OSP.19 
 At the same time, SSAR is subjectively adequate, i.e. it can escape 
SSP. Even though taking a speaker’s word at face value is sometimes 
tantamount to gullibility, this isn’t always the case. All that is need to 
offer a workable solution to SSP, then, is an explanation of the cases in 
which trusting a speaker does amount to gullibility. These cases are 
dealt with by the anti-defeat condition on testimonial entitlement.   
 It may be worth noting that Greco’s social roles can play an 
important role here too: often enough social roles social roles are 
defeater generators: the social roles of being a suspect or a used car 
salesman (Cases 1 and 2) are two clear examples. In the presence of 
defeaters, defeater defeaters will be necessary for testimonial 
entitlement. In other words, proper testimonial belief on the part of the 
hearer will require positive reasons in order to believe what she is 
being told. In this way, while SSAR does grant prima facie testimonial 
entitlement for taking a speaker’s word at face value, this is compatible 
with the idea that in individual cases strong (and sometimes even 
highly specific) reasons are needed before hearers may believe that 
they are being told.  
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Social anti-reductionism takes the source of testimonial epistemic 
entitlement to reside in the intrinsically social character of testimonial 
exchanges. This paper has argued in favor of an ambitious variety 
thereof. According to the view defended here, due to the social norms 
governing testimonial exchanges, hearers are prima facie entitled to 
believe based on mere speakers’ say so.  
                                                 
19 Importantly, no access to information about norm compliance on the part of the 
hearers is needed. Norm compliance is enough to meet OSP. To see the difference, 
take driving. Drivers reliably conform to traffic norms. They will reliably stop the car 
at the red light. In the light of this, I am entitled to cross the street on a green light. I 
don’t need to know that the drivers will stop. Children, for instance, don’t have the 
cognitive sophistication for any of this. They are (objectively) entitled to cross the 
street in virtue of norm compliance on drivers’ side itself, not in virtue of having 
epistemic access to it. 
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 Of course, like with all other types of entitlement, testimonial 
entitlement too lives and dies with defeat responsiveness. In the 
presence of defeaters, e.g. when there is reason to believe speaker’s 
interest in lying overrides the social benefits involved in norm 
compliance, hearers will need positive reasons to trust their testifiers. 
However, insofar as norm compliance is the default for speakers, all 
else equal, entitlement to believe is the default for hearers.20 
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Andersen, S., Ertaç, S., Gneezy, U., Hoffman, M., & List, J. A. (2011). 
Stakes Matter in Ultimatum Games. The American Economic 
Review, 3427-3439.  
Audi, R. (1997). The Place of Testimony in the Fabric of Knowledge and 
Justification. American Philosophical Quarterly 34:405-22. 
Audi, R. (2004). The A Priori Authority of Testimony. Philosophical 
Issues, 14: 18–34. 
Audi, R. (2006). Testimony, Credulity, and Veracity. In Lackey and Sosa 
2006. 
Bicchieri, C. (2006). The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics 
of Social Norms. Cambridge University Press.  
Bolton, G. (1991). A comparative model of bargaining: theory and 
evidence. Levine’s Working Paper Archive 263, David K. Levine.  
Bond, C.F. and DePaulo, B.M. (2006). Accuracy of Deception Judgments. 
Personality and Social Psychology Review, Vol. 10, No. 3, 214–234 
Burge, T. (1993). Content Preservation. Philosophical Review 102:457-
488. 
Burge, T. (1997). Interlocution, Perception, Memory. Philosophical 
Studies 86:21-47. 
Burge, T. (1999). Comprehension and Interpretation. In L. Hahn, ed., 
The Philosophy of Donald Davidson. LaSalle: Open Court. 
Coady, C.A.J. (1973). Testimony and Observation. American 
Philosophical Quarterly 10:149-155. 
Coady, C.A.J. (1992). Testimony: A Philosophical Study. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
Douven, I. (2006). Assertion, Knowledge and Rational Credibility. 
Philosophical Review 115.  
                                                 
20 Acknowledgements. We’d like to thank Sandy Goldberg, Peter Graham, John Greco, 
the audience of a conference on epistemic dependence at the University of Madrid and 
three anonymous referees for helpful comments on this paper.  
 22 
Faulkner, P. (2011) Knowledge on Trust (Oxford University Press). 
Fricker, E. (1995). Telling and Trusting: Reductionism and Anti-
Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony. Mind 104:393-411  
Goldberg, S. (2006). Reductionism and the Distinctiveness of 
Testimonial Knowledge. In Lackey and Sosa 2006. 
Goldberg, S. (2010). Relying on Others. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Goldberg, S. (2014). Interpersonal Epistemic Entitlements. Philosophical 
Issues, Vol. 24/1: 159–183 
Goldman, A. (1999). Knowledge in a Social World. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
Graham, P. J. (2010). Testimonial Entitlement and the Function of 
Comprehension. In A. Haddock, A. Millar, D. Pritchards, eds., Social 
Epistemology. Oxford University Press.  
Graham, P.J. (2012). Testimony, Trust, and Social Norms. Abstracta, 
Special Issue IV, 92-117. 
Graham, P.J. (2015). Epistemic Normativity and Social Norms. In David 
Henderson & John Greco (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful 
Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 247-273. 
Greco, J. (Forthcoming). What is Transmission? Episteme. 
Greco, J. (2015). Testimonial Knowledge and the Flow of information. In 
Henderson D.K. and Greco J. (eds), Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful 
Epistemology. Oxford University Press, 274-291.jop; /] 
Green, C.R. (2016). Epistemology of Testimony. Internet Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/ep-testi/.  
Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social 
intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review. 108, 
814-834  
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., & Gintis, H. (Eds.). 
(2004). Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments 
and Ethographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies. 
Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. 
Heinrich, J. and Heinrich, N. (2007). Why Humans Cooperate: A Cultural 
and Evolutionary Explanation. Oxford University Press. 
Hume, D. (1739). A Treatise of Human Nature. 1888 edition, L.A. Selby-
Bigge, ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Kelp, C. (2009). Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of 
Knowledge. By Jennifer Lackey. Philosophical Quarterly 59:748-50.  
Kelp, C. (Forthcoming). Assertion: A Function First Account. Noûs. 
Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2017). Criticism and Blame in Action and 
Assertion. Journal of Philosophy 114:76-93. 
Kraut, R. (1980). Humans as Lie Detectors: Some Second Thoughts. 
Journal of Communication. 30, 209-16. 
 23 
Lackey, J. and E. Sosa (eds.), 2006, The Epistemology of Testimony, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Lackey, J. (2003). Non-reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony. 
Nous, 37: 706–735. 
Lackey, J. (2007). Norms of Assertion. Nous 41, 594-626. 
Lackey, J. (2008). Learning from Words, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Levine, T., Park, H., & McCornack, S. (1999). Accuracy in Detecting 
Truths and Lies: Documenting the “Veracity Effect”. Communication 
Monographs. 66, 125–144. 
Lipton, P. (1998). The Epistemology of Testimony. British Journal for the 
History and Philosophy of Science 29:1-31. 
Lyons, J. (1997). Testimony, Induction, and Folk Psychology. 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75:163-78. 
Michaelian, K. (2010). In Defence of Gullibility: The Epistemology of 
Testimony and the Psychology of Deception Detection. Synthese 
176(3): 399–427. 
Ochs, J. and Roth, A. E. (1989). An experimental study of sequential 
bargaining. American Economic Review, 79(3):355–84.  
Pritchard, D. (2004). The Epistemology of Testimony. Philosophical 
Studies, 14: 326–348. 
Reid, T. (1764). An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of 
Common Sense. Excerpts in 1975 edition, Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company. 
Simion, M. (2016a). Testimonial Contractarianism. 
Simion, M. (2016b). Assertion: Knowledge is Enough. Synthese 
193:4041-56. 
Vrij, A. (2000). Detecting Lies and Deceit: The Psychology of Lying and 
the Implications for Professional Practice. New York: Wiley. 
Weiner, M. (2005). Must We Know What We Say? Philosophical Review. 
114: 227-251 
 
 
